Remember P90X? Its maker's revenue has cratered

Today, I'm digging into The Beachbody Company (BODI).

If you’re like me, you’ve heard of Beachbody. They make at-home workout programs and nutrition products, and they sell access to them as subscriptions plus shakes/supplements.

I'm not sure if this is dating me or if I should be embarrassed by it, but I did a lot of P90X workouts back in the day. They were intense!

The big thing about Beachbody right now is the insane collapse in its revenue post-COVID. Revenue fell from $873M in 2021 to $252M in 2025, a drop of $621M, or about 71%. Ouch!!

A few things that stood out to me:

• The company is now profitable on an operating basis for the first time since going public, even as revenue fell another 40% in 2025. Gross margin hit 73%, up from 61% two years earlier. They have done this by cutting lower margin hardware, while relying on recurring/subscription nutrition products.

• They killed their own distribution model. The multi-level marketing "coach" network that built the brand over two decades was wound down by January 2025 and replaced with a single-level affiliate program. Management called the old model "outdated and unsustainable” And they stated that the support apparatus for the coach network added up to $54 million in annualized expenses.

• All of this resulted in the their break-even point dropped from north of $430M in to under $225M.

• They've lowered their employee count from 1,021 in 2021 to 270 in 2025. I have no idea how this company ever needed a 1,000+ employees.

A couple more negative realities:

• Revenue is still falling, and at $252M the company is a fraction of its former self with what appears to be no proven growth engine yet.

• The market cap is about $73M. The market has little faith that they are going to be able to grow the business.

Here's the main take away. Most teams treat their cost structure as fixed and their revenue as the variable to fix. Beachbody knew they needed to right-size their business, so they made some rather draconian business model adjustments that are giving them the lifeline to continue to try to uncover growth engines.

If (and it's a big if) they can find a growth engine to grow this higher quality revenue, this could be an impressive comeback story.

I’ll see you on Saturday!

Nick

TL;DR

• Beachbody (BODI) is the fitness-and-nutrition company behind P90X, Insanity, and Shakeology. It now sells digital workout subscriptions and nutrition products under the BODi brand, mostly direct-to-consumer in the US.

• Revenue has fallen for four straight years, from $873M in 2021 to $251.7M in 2025, as the home-fitness boom unwound and the company dismantled its coach network.

• The flip side: gross margin climbed from 61% (2023) to 73% (2025), operating income turned positive for the first time as a public company (+$8.0M), and full-year free cash flow was positive at $17.4M. The balance sheet now holds net cash of about $13.5M.

• In late 2024 management blew up its 26-year multi-level marketing model, cut roughly a third of staff, and dropped the annual break-even point from over $430M of revenue to under $225M. That single move is the whole story.

• Stock performance tells two stories at once: down about 98% over five years (the SPAC era was a wipeout), but up roughly 104% over the trailing year as the turnaround took hold. That 1Y gain beat both Herbalife (+37%) and Peloton (-27%).

• The N.O.O.B. Nine average lands at a thin 1.7 out of 5. A nostalgic brand and a sticky nutrition subscription are real, but there is little structural lock-in here.

The 30,000-Foot View

Beachbody sells health and wellness three ways, and the mix has shifted hard toward the high-margin pieces.

For fiscal 2025, the revenue split by product line was:

• Digital: $153.3M (61% of revenue). Subscriptions to the BODi app and its library of live and on-demand fitness and nutrition content.

• Nutrition and Other: $97.6M (39%). Shakeology shakes, Beachbody Performance supplements, BEACHBAR, and the LADDER brand. This is the recurring auto-ship engine.

• Connected Fitness: $2.2M (under 1%). The BODi Bike hardware business, now almost fully wound down (it was $11.4M a year earlier).

Geographically this is a US story: $232.6M (92%) domestic versus $19.2M (8%) international in 2025.

The model used to run on an army of independent "coaches" who sold subscriptions and shakes for commissions, classic multi-level marketing. That network is gone. Today the company centralizes on one eCommerce platform at BODi.com, sells direct, and pushes into Amazon affiliate and traditional retail channels.

Key Stats:

• Ticker: BODI (Nasdaq Capital Market)

• Price: $9.39 (post a 1-for-30 reverse split, so do not be fooled by the clean number)

• Market cap: roughly $68M

• Enterprise value: roughly $55M (the company sits on net cash)

• FY2025 revenue: $251.7M

• Gross margin: 73%

• Full-time employees: 270 (down from 582 at the end of 2023)

• Founded: 1998. Public since January 2021 via SPAC.

• CEO and co-founder: Carl Daikeler

• 1Y total return: +138.9%

• EV / Sales: about 0.2x

After a brutal multi-year decline, the stock has compounded about 104% over the trailing twelve months as the cost cuts flowed through to the bottom line. The long-run chart and the short-run chart point in opposite directions, which is exactly what a credible turnaround looks like in its early innings.

Show Me the Money

*TTM figures are estimated from trailing-twelve-month ratios because the clean TTM income statement was not retrievable. Treat the TTM column as directional. [VERIFY]

Standout financial features:

• About as ugly of a topline as you’ll see in a public company.

• Margin improvement. Gross margin went from 61% to 73% in two years while revenue was cut in half. That is the signature of a deliberate mix shift, out of low-margin connected-fitness hardware and into digital subscriptions and nutrition.

• Operating income flipped from a $141M loss in 2023 to a $8.0M profit in 2025. 

• The balance sheet is OK. Net debt went from roughly breakeven to a $13.5M net cash position, helped by $21.8M of operating cash flow and $17.4M of free cash flow in 2025.

Stock Performance

Dividend-adjusted total returns through June 10, 2026:

*BODI has no 10-year history. It went public via SPAC in January 2021, so there is no price before then.

One-year head-to-head against two public comparables:

The operator read: BODI beat both peers handily over the past year, but that is a recovery off a near-total wipeout.

Company History

• 1998: Carl Daikeler and Jon Congdon found the company (originally Product Partners) and build a direct-response infomercial machine selling fitness DVDs.

• 2004 to 2010: The breakout hits land. P90X (with trainer Tony Horton) and later Insanity (Shaun T) become cultural touchstones, sold through late-night infomercials and a growing network of "coaches."

• 2014: Beachbody on Demand launches, moving the DVD library into streaming and setting up the subscription model that defines the company today.

• 2018 to 2020: The coach network and Shakeology auto-ship drive scale. The pandemic supercharges at-home fitness, and 2020 revenue reaches about $880M.

• January 2021: The company goes public by merging with Forest Road Acquisition Corp (a SPAC) and folding in Myx Fitness to add a connected bike. Early trading is near $25 per share (pre reverse split).

• 2021 to 2023: The home-fitness boom reverses. Revenue falls from $873M (2021) to $696M (2022) to $527M (2023). Losses pile up.

• 2023: A 1-for-30 reverse stock split keeps the listing compliant. The "BODi" rebrand takes hold and the ticker becomes BODI.

• September to November 2024: The pivotal move. Management announces it will shut down the multi-level marketing network (fully wound down by January 1, 2025), shift to a single-level affiliate model and omnichannel retail, cut the workforce by about 33%, and target $54M of annualized cost savings. Break-even drops from over $430M to under $225M of revenue.

• 2025: Three consecutive quarters of positive net income, the first full-year operating profit and positive free cash flow as a public company. Revenue lands at $251.7M with 73% gross margin.

• Early 2026: BODi launches a line of P90X-branded supplements and nutrition products across BODi.com and select retail partners, leaning on its most recognizable program name to seed the retail push.

The N.O.O.B. Nine

A quick note before the scores: the skill's exact nine-power rubric file was not accessible in this session, so I scored against the standard moat framework (the seven Helmer powers plus cost advantage and customer capture). Nick, please re-score against the canonical N.O.O.B. Nine rubric before publishing.

Average: 1.7 out of 5.

Moat summary: a thin moat resting on faded brand equity and a high-margin nutrition subscription, with almost no structural lock-in to keep customers from leaving.

Memorable Marketing

Beachbody is, at its core, one of the great direct-response marketing organizations of the last 25 years. The tactics are worth studying even as the business shrinks.

• The infomercial flywheel (2000s). P90X and Insanity were not sold in stores. They were sold at midnight on cable, with before-and-after transformations and a money-back guarantee, then reinforced by community. The product was fitness. The real product was belief that this time it would work.

• Branded program identities. "P90X," "Insanity," "21 Day Fix," and "Shakeology" are named products, not generic categories. Each name does marketing work on its own and travels by word of mouth.

• The coach army (2010s). Tens of thousands of independent coaches turned customers into a distributed, commission-motivated sales force on social media. It was extraordinarily effective at acquisition, and it is exactly what management decided was no longer worth the cost.

• Transformation-led social proof. User before-and-after results were the centerpiece of every campaign. The marketing asset was the customer.

• P90X as a retail beachhead (2026). The new supplement line deliberately reuses the most recognizable program name to earn shelf space and Amazon visibility.

Tactical takeaways for an operator:

• A great brand name is a marketing budget you only pay for once. Name your products like they matter.

• A motivated distribution network can be your cheapest growth channel and your most expensive liability at the same time. Know which one it is before you scale it.

• Social proof from real customers outperforms anything you can say about yourself.

• When you enter a new channel, lead with your single most recognizable asset, not your newest one.

AI Uses and Opportunities

What is already true:

• BODi lists AI personalization as a named strategic initiative alongside features like BODi Blocks (block-periodized monthly programs). The pitch is data-driven, customized training to lift retention and average revenue per user.

• The company frames its future inside the broader virtual-fitness trend, where AI-led personalization is becoming table stakes.

Where AI could actually move the needle here:

• Retention, not acquisition. The hardest problem in subscription fitness is churn after January. AI that adapts a program when a user stalls or misses workouts targets the exact moment people quit.

• Nutrition cross-sell. Connecting workout data to Shakeology and supplement recommendations could lift the high-margin nutrition attach rate, which is where the real money is.

• Content efficiency. A small company with a big library can use AI to repackage and personalize existing content rather than fund expensive new shoots, protecting margin.

• Affiliate enablement. With the coach network gone, AI tooling that helps single-level affiliates create content and target customers could partly replace the old human network at a fraction of the cost.

• Coaching at the margin. An AI "coach" is a cheaper, infinitely scalable version of the human accountability that the brand was historically built on.

Bumps in the Road

• Revenue is still shrinking. Profitability came from cuts, not growth. Until the top line stabilizes, the turnaround is only half-proven. A business cannot shrink to greatness forever.

• No structural moat. Customers can leave for free, and the competitive set (Apple, Peloton, YouTube, every fitness app) is enormous and better capitalized.

• The pivot is unproven. Replacing a 26-year MLM distribution engine with affiliate and retail channels is a bet that the new channels can acquire customers as cheaply as the old coaches did. That is not yet demonstrated.

• Microcap fragility. A roughly $73M market cap, thin trading volume, and a history that already wiped out long-term holders once. Sentiment can swing hard in both directions.

• Brand drift. P90X and Shakeology carry nostalgia, but nostalgia is a depreciating asset. If the brand stops feeling current, the one real advantage erodes.

Your Swipe File

• It's okay to walk away from revenue if it is no longer core to your strategy. They walked away from a low-margin product line (connected fitness hardware) lifted gross margin 12 points even as sales fell.

• Your distribution model can outlive its usefulness. The coach network built the company but the $54 million in annualized support costs no longer could be supported by the lower revenue base.

• When you launch into a new channel, lead with your most famous asset. BODi is using the P90X name, not a new brand, to earn retail shelf space.

• I continue to be blown away by how many people some of these companies employ. Employee growth should never be a KPI, and it seems like it is for a lot of companies. A lot of growing companies come to regret it and have to do painful right-sizing. This can be avoided.